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WELCOME TO FABULOUS LAS VEGAS:
THE NEVADA GAMING REGULATORY




It should come as no shock to hear that the United States economy is
experiencing a downward spiral.  The Nevada gaming industry, to which
Nevada’s economic health is so closely tied, has not been insulated from this
downward spiral.1  In troubled times like these, desperation invites opportu-
nism.  As a result, an old market player has stepped into a new and prominent
role in the global economy.  Cue the hero music; enter Sovereign Wealth Funds
(“SWF”), stage right.  But just as with any well-known hero, SWFs are not
without flaws.  In fact, SWFs’ sizable investments in crucial sectors of the
national economy have sparked concern and debate among both scholars and
policy makers.  The regulatory mechanisms designed to deal with SWFs must
provide the proper amount of oversight necessary to ensure an open and stable
international economic system while also protecting our nation’s national
security concerns.2
The bulk of recent scholarly work surrounding SWFs is dedicated to
assessing the federal regulatory systems’ adequacy—or likely, inadequacy—in
dealing with issues unique to SWF investment.  However, the federal regula-
tory system has not been the only regulatory body to deal with SWF investment
in the United States.  In 2008, one of the United Arab Emirates’ (“UAE”)
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1 Gaming is Nevada’s largest industry and gaming revenues account for 23.3% of the state’s
budget. See RESEARCH DIV., LEGIS. COUNS. BUREAU, POLICY AND PROGRAM REPORT ON
REVENUE AND BUDGET 3 (Nev. 2010), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/
Research/Publications/PandPReports/20-RB.pdf.
2 Clay Lowery, Treas. Assistant Sec’y for Int’l Affairs, Remarks to Barclays Capital’s 12th
Annual Global Inflation-Linked Conference (Feb. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Lowery], http://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp836.aspx.
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SWFs, Dubai World, made a large investment into the Nevada gaming industry
and was found suitable to purchase up to twenty percent of MGM Mirage’s
stock.3  This article will address how the Nevada gaming regulatory system has
found an effective way to deal with SWF investment in a manner that maintains
an open market welcoming to foreign direct investment yet avoids compromis-
ing Nevada’s stringent gaming investment standards.
A. A Primer on Sovereign Wealth Funds
What is a SWF?  “Broadly speaking, . . . SWFs are actively managed,
government-owned capital pools originating from foreign exchange assets[ ]”
and are created to invest surplus funds into private markets abroad.4  However,
it is important to note that currently there is no widely accepted definition of a
SWF.5
Although SWFs escape an agreed-upon definition, the U.S. Treasury
Department has conceptually classified SWFs as generally falling into one of
two distinct categories.  These two categories are based on the source from
which the foreign exchange assets are created.6  The first category is “commod-
ity SWFs,” which derives its name from the exportation of natural resources.7
Countries with commodity SWFs are simply replacing a physical asset in the
ground with a financial asset that they will use to invest in foreign markets in
an attempt to transform short-term natural resource wealth into long-term eco-
nomic diversification.8  Commodity SWFs are designed to guard against boom
and bust economic cycles prevalent to economies that rely heavily on natural
resource exportation.9  The second category is “non-Commodity SWFs,” which
are usually established through transfers of assets from official foreign
exchange reserves into a standalone investment fund that can be invested into
3 Hearing on the Application of Dubai World for a Finding of Suitability as Beneficial
Owners or Shareholders of the Voting Securities of MGM Mirage, Before the Nev. Gaming
Comm’n (Nov. 20, 2008) [hereinafter NGC Dubai World Suitability Hearing].
4 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ECON. AND U.S. INCOME TAX, ISSUES RAISED
BY SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, at 21-22 (JCX-49-08
June 17, 2008), [hereinafter, ISSUES RAISED BY SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS], available at
http://www.jct.gov/x-49-08.pdf.
5 See id. at 21. Both the Treasury and the IMF define SWFs differently and base their
definitions on the sources and objectives of SWF investment.  However, specific categoriza-
tion of SWFs is not pertinent for the purposes of this article.
6 Robert M. Kimmitt, Public Footprints in Private Markets: Sovereign Wealth Funds and
the World Economy, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2008, at 119, 120.
7 Id.
8 See Mark E. Plotkin, Foreign Direct Investment by Sovereign Wealth Funds: Using the
Market and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States Together To Make the
United States More Secure, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 88, 88-89 (2008), http:// thepocket
part.org/ylj-online/scholarship/718-foreign-direct-investment-by-sovereign-wealth-funds.
9 See Lowery, supra note 2; see also Patrick J. Keenan, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Social
Arrears: Should Debts to Citizens be Treated Differently than Debts to Other Creditors?, 49
VA. J. INT’L L. 431, 432 (2009) (citations omitted) (discussing how commodity based SWFs
are used to invest reserves or earnings from commodity trades).
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foreign markets with the hope of garnering higher returns.10  Assets of this type
of SWF resemble “borrowed money” rather than traditional wealth.11
Although SWFs have recently begun to cause a stir, they are not a new
type of foreign direct investment (“FDI”).  In fact, SWFs have been a global
market player since 195312 and, until recently, have operated in relative obscu-
rity.  However, what is new about SWFs is their rapid growth in both number
and size.13  Twenty years ago, only a few funds managed total assets in the
billion-dollar range.14  In 2008, there were approximately forty SWFs manag-
ing assets over one billion dollars,15 with twelve established since 2005.16  As
of February 2008, the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) approximated that
total assets under SWF management ranged from two to three trillion dollars.17
The IMF has also postulated that SWFs are likely to become even more impor-
tant in the future because growth predictions indicate that foreign assets under
the management of SWFs could reach up to the six to ten trillion-dollar range
by the year 2013.18
II. WHY SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS HAVE BECOME
SUCH A PROMINENT TOPIC
SWFs have become an increasingly prominent topic because the size of
their investment activity has changed.  This alteration can be attributed to con-
sistent changes in the U.S. economy.  For the last quarter century, the U.S. has
been a net importer and consumer of goods and services.19  Add this trade
deficit to an investment banking business model that heavily relied on leverage,
the sub-prime mortgage collapse,20 and a paltry domestic savings rate,21 and
voila; the “great recession”22 is now upon us.  Simply put, “Americans have
been spending other people’s money or [their] own future money for far too
10 Kimmitt, supra note 6, at 121.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 119.  The Kuwait Investment Board was created in 1953 to invest its surplus oil
revenue and is perhaps the first ever SWF.
13 Lowery, supra note 2.
14 Id.
15 Kimmitt, supra note 6, at 121.  The exact number of SWFs is hard to estimate due to the
fact that they are often not transparent. Id.
16 Id. at 119.
17 Int’l Monetary Fund, Sovereign Wealth Funds-A Work Agenda, at 6 (Feb. 29, 2008),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/022908.pdf.
18 Id.
19 ISSUES RAISED BY SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, supra note 4, at 1.
20 See Forrest Norman, Private Equity, Sovereign Funds and the Global Credit Crunch,
DUKE L. MAG., Winter 2009, at 3 (Stephen Schwarzman, chairman and co-founder of the
Blackstone Group and former head of Lehman Brothers’ global mergers and acquisitions
team, citing bad mortgages as a link in the chain of events that led to the U.S. economic
collapse).
21 See Kurt Andersen, That was Then. . .and This is Now. Our 30-year winning streak
couldn’t last forever.  Now we’re sobering up.  How a reset can make America a saner,
better place, TIME, Apr. 6, 2009, at 34.  By 2007, the average household saved less than 1%
of its disposable income. Id.
22 Id.
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long[.]”23  Therefore, the current economic situation has essentially pushed
increased amounts of SWF investment in the U.S.24
A. The Jekyll and Hyde Nature of Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment
Many questions still surround SWF investment, with the bulk of the ques-
tions centering on whether SWFs are investing large amounts of money into
U.S. companies and around the world for economic or political reasons.  How-
ever, the benefits that accompany SWF investment into the U.S. economy can-
not be denied; but then again, neither can the risks.  Thus, the question
becomes: are SWFs a part of the solution or are they a part of the problem?
Well, “that depends.”25
SWFs create both theoretical and regulatory challenges because of their
dichotomous nature.26  Although SWFs bolster the national economy by infus-
ing much needed capital to some of its largest financial institutions,27 these
bailouts come at a price.  Part of that price is the introduction of state-capital-
ism into the United States’ traditionally market-capitalism system.28  The
23 Norman, supra note 20, at 3 (Gao Xiqing, Vice Chairman, President, and Chief Invest-
ment Officer of The China Investment Group, China’s sovereign-investment fund, discuss-
ing the effect of America’s overspending on its status as a world leader.)  According to Duke
Professor, James Cox, moderator of the financial panel, “a year ago, we would have been
having a debate and discussion here about the role of sovereign wealth funds. . .Little did we
know that in a few months time, sovereign wealth funds in various parts of the world were
going to be bailing out our banks [and] financial institutions.” Id. at 2.
24 Id. at 2-3.
25 David H. McCormick, Treas. Under-Sec’y for Int’l Affairs, Remarks at the Tuck Global
Capital Markets Conference (Feb. 15, 2008), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/hp832.aspx (stating that SWFs might be the answer to our country’s financial
woes if they foster openness and make market based decisions without political undertones).
26 Keenan, supra note 9, at 432.
27 Peter Heyward, Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments in U.S. Financial Institutions: Too
Much or Not Enough?, 27 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., MAY 2008, at 19, 20.
Heyward discusses the major SWF investments into the U.S. marketplace that have occurred
in the last two years.  For example, China’s SWF made a $3 billion purchase of a 10% non-
voting stake in the Blackstone Group and a $5 billion dollar purchase of a stake in Morgan
Stanley. Id.  Abu Dhabi’s SWF purchased $7.9 billion worth of Citigroup shares, making it
the largest shareholder of Citigroup. Id.  Singapore’s SWF purchased $4.4 billion dollars of
Merill Lynch stock. Id.  Finally, Korea, Kuwait and Japan’s SWFs purchased $6.6 billion
dollars of mandatory preferred stock in Merill Lynch. Id.; see also Turmoil in U.S. Credit
Markets: Examining the U.S. Regulatory Framework for Assessing Sovereign Investments:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008)
(statement of Scott G. Alvarez, Gen. Couns., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.)
(stating that in all, SWF’s direct investment into U.S. financial firms between August 2007
and April 2008 amounted to more than $30 billion, of which $17 billion was invested in
commercial banking organizations, accounting for a substantial portion of the new capital
raised by U.S. banks during that period).
28 Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Govern-
ance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1346 (2008)
(citing Peter S. Goodman & Louise Story, Overseas Investors Buying U.S. Holdings at
record Pace, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2008).  The authors dub this situation as “new mercantil-
ism,” wherein a government actor becomes a direct participant in the market in order to
further profit maximization goals for the state, as opposed to the American concept of a
capitalist economy based on free-markets and reduced government participation in the mar-
ket-place. Id.
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dichotomy arises from this relationship because SWFs are expected to behave
like a private actor in the financial market being motivated solely by profit,29
yet many scholars and policy makers fear that SWFs may be motivated by a
political agenda, wherein they would seek the advancement of their govern-
ment’s strategic interests through ownership of controlling interests in vital
industries and institutions of finance.30  This fear cannot be ignored, particu-
larly because SWFs “represent large, concentrated, and often non-transparent
positions in financial markets,”31 and because they invest heavily in companies
and industries that even astute U.S. investors will not touch.32
Therefore, SWFs are seen as having a “Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde”33 nature,
simultaneously observed as the hero in shining armor coming to rescue the
country from its economic woes, while also being viewed as a potential villain
with a clandestine motive to take positions of control in American corporations
or vital industries in order to advance strategic foreign government interests.
Given this dichotomy, SWF investment becomes a double-edged sword.  How-
ever, because the economies of the nation, as well as Nevada, are in such dire
straits, a time-honored adage passed on by many grandmothers may apply:
“Beggars can’t be choosers.”34
B. The Benefits Associated With Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment
One facet of SWFs exudes all the positive benefits that their investments
bring to our economy.  The U.S. Treasury stated that “sovereign wealth funds
have the potential to promote financial stability[ ]” because they have shown
themselves to be stable long-term investors that contribute significant amounts
of capital to the financial system.35  This claim of long-term stability is bol-
stered by the fact that SWFs “typically do not use leverage or have capital
requirements that could force them to liquidate positions rapidly.”36  Because
large amounts of leverage are part of the reason the U.S. economy is in dire
straits, a SWF’s unique position could allow it to invest in the U.S. long-term
and not be affected by the whims of short-term volatility.37  One can only pos-
tulate what would have happened if SWFs had not stepped in and shouldered
some of the burden of stabilizing the U.S.’s ailing financial system.
29 Keenan, supra note 9, at 432-33 (citing Roland Beck & Michael Fidora, The Impact of
Sovereign Wealth Funds on Global Financial Markets 5 (Eur. Cent. Bank, Occasional Paper
No. 91, 2008)).
30 Id. at 433 (citing Stephanie Kirchgaessner, “Congressional Angst” Scuppers Chinese
Bid, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005, at 22).
31 Lowery, supra note 2.
32 Heyward, supra note 27, at 20.
33 Reference to Robert Louis Stevenson’s classic novel STRANGE CASE OF DR. JEKYLL AND
MR. HYDE, a fictional novel that explores the duality of human nature, which is split in the
sense that within the same person there is both an apparently good and an evil personality,
each being quite distinct from the other.
34 I would like to thank my grandmother, Florence Lavecchia, for her help in raising me and
teaching me so much about life.
35 Lowery, supra note 2.
36 Id.
37 Id.
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A concrete example of foreign-owned firms’ positive involvement in the
U.S. economy, and a reason why SWF investment may be beneficial to the U.S.
economy, can be observed by the contributions foreign-owned firms are
already giving back to the U.S. economy.  Foreign-owned firms’ business
activities are responsible for the employment of nearly one in ten of the U.S.
private sector jobs that usually pay higher wages.38
A second benefit of being open to international investment is the possibil-
ity of reciprocity.  SWF investment may have the potential to lead investor
nations to open their markets up to the U.S. enterprises in which SWFs
invest.39  This would allow U.S. businesses greater access to developing mar-
kets and could open up business opportunities previously closed to U.S.
firms.40
Third, international investment in the U.S. has the potential to bring new
technology into the economy, to introduce new business methods to American
industries, and to foster healthy business competition that, in turn, could result
in a business environment that promotes innovation, productivity, lower prices,
and new variety for consumers.41
C. The Risks Associated With Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment
Although the potential benefits of SWF investment in the U.S. cannot be
overlooked, some observers and policy makers fear the substantial risks
involved with achieving such benefits.42  Most of the concerns SWFs generate
stem from the fact that SWFs are indeed government-controlled entities.  This
tends to make many Americans uncomfortable because the U.S. economy does
not have a tradition of government ownership.43  In fact, in many advanced
economies based on a market capitalism model like the U.S., it is the individual
company whose value is to be maximized, not the state’s.44  Consequently,
government ownership in market capitalism economies is traditionally viewed
with suspicion.45  Two reasons underlie this suspicion.  First, wide-ranging
38 McCormick, supra note 25.
39 Paul Rose, Sovereigns as Shareholders, 87 N.C. L. REV. 83, 92-93 (2008) (citation omit-
ted) (giving the example of a recent Chinese SWF investment into the U.S., which may
encourage China to open its developing markets to U.S. firms).
40 Id.
41 McCormick, supra note 25.
42 Sovereign Wealth Funds: Foreign Policy Consequences in an Era of New Money: Hear-
ing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. (2008).  Ranking member Rich-
ard Lugar stressed the balance that needs to be maintained between maintaining an open
market but still safeguarding national security interests, considering that SWFs governmental
ties imply that they could be “used to apply political pressure, manipulate markets, gain
access to sensitive technologies, or undermine economic rivals.” Id.
43 Mark E. Plotkin, Foreign Direct Investment by Sovereign Wealth Funds: Using the Mar-
ket and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States Together To Make the
United States More Secure, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 88, 91 (2008), http://thepocketpart.
org/ylj-online/scholarship/718-foreign-direct-investment-by-sovereign-wealth-funds.
44 Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 28, at 1346.
45 Plotkin, supra note 43, at 91; see also Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 28, at 1346 (stating
that most European Union and World Trade Organization rules “are designed to prevent
governments from shifting the level of profit maximization from the company to the state”).
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government ownership in the private market is an unaccustomed concept.46
Second, governments do not have a successful history as private market partici-
pants, which may be attributable to misaligned incentive structures and a per-
ceived lack of sensitivity to market stimuli.47  This cultural sensitivity to
government control is not assuaged by the fact that “[SWFs] represent large,
concentrated, and non-transparent positions in financial markets[.]”48
Lack of transparency is one of the principal reasons policy makers, pun-
dits, and observers alike ring the alarm bells concerning national security.
Some argue that it is not a far stretch to imagine that if a foreign government is
seeking some sort of political gain through its investment then the government
“may be willing to accept lower financial returns . . . because [it] judge[s] the
success of an investment not just by measuring its financial return, but also by
whether it achieves [its] political objectives.”49  Additionally, national security
concerns also arise about SWFs amassing large amounts of U.S. investments
and the possibility of using their financial power as a bargaining chip with the
federal government through threats of divestment-terror.50
Aside from the national security risks SWF investment engenders, there
are also non-national security concerns that surround SWF investment.  Due to
their sheer size, SWFs have the capability to move markets and cause volatility
just by shifting asset allocations.51  Again, a lack of transparency drives these
fears.  Because there are no uniform rules of disclosure, it becomes very diffi-
cult for other market participants to make informed decisions without having
some idea of how a SWF is going to act.52  Even a rumor of a possible shift
“may cause market participants to react to what they perceive sovereign wealth
funds to be doing.”53
Equally worrisome is the possibility that SWFs may be able to achieve an
unfair advantage over private investors because they may be able to marshal
their government intelligence or security services to gather exclusive non-pub-
lic information not normally available to the average commercial investor.54
The Securities and Exchange Commission has already expressed its concerns
about regulating SWFs in these types of situations, noting that it can anticipate
the conflict of interest challenges when asking a foreign government for
46 Plotkin, supra note 43, at 91.
47 Id; see also Kimmitt, supra note 6, at 124 (“[T]he U.S. economy is built on the belief that
private firms allocate capital more efficiently than governments.”).
48 Lowery, supra note 2 (expounding on some of the risks that SWFs may present).
49 Victor Fleischer, Should We Tax Sovereign Wealth Funds?, 118 YALE L. J. POCKET PART
93, 96 (2008), http://thepocketpart.org/ylj-online/scholarships/719-should-we-tax-sovereign-
wealth-funds.
50 See Rose, supra note 39, at 94-95 (citation omitted) (discussing the possibility of a SWF
threatening to withdraw its billions from the U.S. economy if the federal government doesn’t
adopt a policy favorable to its country’s political position); see also Heyward, supra note 27,
at 21 (stating that the risk of SWFs pulling their money out of the U.S. institutions that they
have invested in may be more devastating to the U.S. economy than the small amount of
control they have achieved over the company from their investment).
51 Lowery, supra note 2.
52 Int’l Monetary Fund, supra note 17, at 16-17 (citing Gai and Shin, “Transparency and
Financial Stability,” Bank of England Financial Stability Report (Dec. 2003).
53 Lowery, supra note 2.
54 Kimmitt, supra note 6, at 124.
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enforcement assistance in investigating a SWF for market abuses such as
insider trading.55  These types of non-national security risks could be as devas-
tating to the U.S. economy as the national security risks because public confi-
dence in the market is an important factor in the success of free-market
systems.  A lack of public confidence could lead to fewer people investing in
the market and could cripple market performance.
Both the national security risks and non-national security risks of SWF
investment have the potential to affect the global economy in significant ways.
However, numerous authorities that have been following SWF investment point
out that the biggest danger to the global economy at this time is over-protective
policy responses to SWF investment.56
III. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK GOVERNING
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
The U.S. Treasury Department has acknowledged that SWFs are here to
stay and will likely be a pivotal player in the emerging global economy.57
Thus far, the U.S. response to SWF investment has been three-fold.  First, the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) evaluates
investments that may result in foreign control of U.S. businesses and may raise
national security concerns.58  Second, the U.S. worked with several other coun-
tries to help the IMF develop a set of voluntary best practices to which SWFs
should adhere.59  Lastly, the U.S. is also working with the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development, which has developed best practices
guidelines for countries that receive SWF investments.60
A. The U.S. Government’s Regulatory Framework for Sovereign Wealth
Fund Investment
“With great power comes great responsibility.”61  CFIUS plays a domi-
nant role in regulating SWF investment.  Established in 1975 pursuant to Exec-
utive Order 11858,62 CFIUS is tasked with monitoring foreign investment in
the U.S. and developing and implementing related policies.63  However, these
tasks carry an onerous burden.  CIFUS must balance free-market principles by
55 Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Gauer Distinguished Lecture in
Law and Policy at the American Enterprise Institute Legal Center for the Public Interest: The
Rise of Sovereign Business (Dec. 5, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch1205
07cc.htm.
56 See e.g. Kimmitt, supra note 6, at 126.
57 See Lowery, supra note 2.
58 Id.  The U.S. Treasury Department actually chairs this committee.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Famous last words of Uncle Ben to his nephew Peter Parker. SPIDER-MAN (Columbia
Pictures & Sony Pictures Entertainment 2002).
62 Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 FED. REG. 20,263 (May 7, 1975), reprinted as amended in 50
U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006 & Supp. I 2007).
63 Id., amended by Exec. Order No. 13,456, 73 FED. REG. 4,677 (Jan. 23, 2008). See Ste-
phen K. Pudner, Commentary, Moving Forward from Dubai Ports World—The Foreign
Investment and National Security Act of 2007, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (2008).
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allowing SWFs fair and non-discriminatory access to U.S. markets while at the
same time ensuring the nation’s security.64
Since its inception, CFIUS has undergone some major overhauls.  These
alterations have usually followed uproars over CFIUS’s inability to prevent for-
eign investments that could potentially threaten the U.S.’s national security
interests.65  The latest of these alterations came with the 2007 Foreign Invest-
ment and National Security Act (“FINSA”).66  Because CFIUS was originally a
presidential creation, FINSA marked “the first time that Congress brought
CFIUS explicitly under a statutory framework[.]”67
CFIUS consists of: the Treasury Secretary; the heads of the Departments
of State, Homeland Security, Justice, Commerce, Defense, and Energy; and
representatives of the Office of U.S. Trade, and the Office of Science and Tech-
nology Policy.  The following offices also observe and, as appropriate, partici-
pate in CFIUS’s activities: the Office of Management & Budget, the Council of
Economic Advisors, the National Security Council, the National Economic
Council and the Homeland Security Council.  Additionally, the Director of
National Intelligence and the Secretary of Labor are non-voting, ex-officio
members of CFIUS.68
1. How the CFIUS Process Begins
The CFIUS review process can begin with either a voluntary notice to the
committee by a party to a potential transaction or upon the recommendation
from a CFIUS member agency that believes a given transaction may affect U.S.
national security interests.69  Covered transactions that CFIUS may review
include “any merger, acquisition, or takeover . . . by or with any foreign person
which could result in foreign control of any person engaged in interstate com-
merce in the United States.”70
Once CFIUS receives notification that an investment may fall under its
authority, it has thirty days to make a preliminary review of the transaction.71
CFIUS, or the President of the United States acting through CFIUS, must take a
64 See Rose, supra note 39, at 105.
65 A full history of CFIUS is beyond the scope of this article.  For a comprehensive over-
view of CFIUS’s history and changes in the wake of multiple controversies, see Pudner,
supra note 63.
66 Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, H.R. 556, 110th Cong., Pub. L.
No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246 (2007) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2061 (2006)).  FINSA may
have been prompted by Dubai Ports World’s failed acquisition of U.S. port assets and Con-
gress’ ensuing fuss and politicizing over this transaction, which was a very sensitive issue in
the wake of Sept. 11, 2001.  For a full discussion on this issue, see Thomas E. Crocker, What
Banks Need to Know About the Coming Debate Over CFIUS, Foreign Direct Investment,
and Sovereign Wealth Funds, 125 BANKING L.J. 457 (2008); see also George Stephanov
Georgiev, Comment, The Reformed CFIUS Regulatory Framework: Mediating Between
Continued Openness to Foreign Investment and National Security, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 125
(2008) (recounting failed and successful foreign attempts at acquiring U.S. firms and the
political backlash that ensued from these transactions).
67 Pudner, supra note 63, at 1282.
68 H.R. 556 § 3(k)(2); see also Pudner, supra note 63, at 1283.
69 H.R. 556 § 2(b)(1).
70 Id. § 2(a)(3).; see also 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(3) (2006 & Supp. I 2007).
71 H.R. 556 § 2(b)(1)(E).
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number of things into consideration when deciding whether or not a proposed
transaction involves issues that may affect the national security of the U.S.72  If
CFIUS determines that no further investigation is required, it must promptly
notify the parties and allow them to proceed with the acquisition.73  However,
if further national security investigation is warranted, then CFIUS must com-
plete its investigation and report its findings to the President within forty-five
days of the investigation’s commencement.74  The President must then
announce his decision of whether to take action to suspend or prohibit the
transaction due to national security interests within fifteen days following the
completion of CIFUS’ investigation.75  If the President feels that the transac-
tion may threaten national security interests, then he has the power to unravel
the transaction.76  Moreover, the President’s power to unravel the transaction is
not subject to judicial review.77
2. Transactions CFIUS Must Review
In deciding whether to review a transaction, FINSA requires CFIUS to
consider whether the transaction is a foreign government controlled transaction
as opposed to just a private foreign investor.78  Transactions that could result in
a U.S. entity being controlled by a foreign government or entity acting on
behalf of a foreign government (SWFs) are subject to full CFIUS investiga-
tions.79  Additionally, CFIUS must immediately review “transaction[s] that
threaten[ ] to impair the national security of the [U.S. if the] threat has not been
mitigated during or prior to [its initial] review of [the] transaction[.]”80  Under
FINSA, “national security” has a broad definition that encompasses the term
“critical infrastructure.”81  Thus, CFIUS must review any system or assets,
“whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems or assets would have a debilitating impact on
national security[.]”82  CFIUS also has the broad power to review a transaction
72 See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (b)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. I 2007) (stating that “if the Commit-
tee determines that the covered transaction is a foreign government controlled transaction,
the Committee shall conduct an investigation of the transaction . . . “ (emphasis added)).
 This investigation is immediate and is directed at determining the effects of the foreign
government controlled transaction on the national security of the United States. See 50
U.S.C. app. § 2170 (b)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. I 2007).  Section 2170(f) lists the eleven differ-
ent national security factors that the president or his designee may take into account when
conducting an investigation involving a foreign government controlled transaction.
73 H.R. 556 § 2(b)(6).
74 Id. § 2(b)(2)(C).
75 Id. at § 6(d)(1)-(3).
76 Id.
77 Id. § 6(e) (emphasis added).  The presidential power to unravel a transaction has actually
only been exercised once.
78 Id. § 2(a)(4) (“The term foreign government-controlled transaction means any covered
transaction that could result in the control of any person engaged in interstate commerce in
the United States by a foreign government or an entity controlled by or acting on behalf of a
foreign government.”) (emphasis added).
79 Id. § 2(b)(2)(B)(i)(II); see also 31 C.F.R. § 800.204 (2008) (delineating the numerous
ways in which control can be defined by CFIUS).
80 H.R. 556 § 2 (b)(2)(B)(i)(I) (emphasis added).
81 Id. § 2(a)(5).
82 Id. § 2(a)(6).
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based solely upon the lead agency’s recommendation and the committee’s con-
currence.83  In the alternative, CFIUS may decide against reviewing the trans-
action if the Treasury Secretary and the head of the lead agency jointly
determine that the transaction will not threaten U.S. national security.84
In practice, CFIUS has been reluctant to initiate investigations due to its
fear of perceptions that CFIUS may discourage foreign investment and create a
conflict with the U.S.’s open investment policy.85  Nevertheless, many compa-
nies whose transactions may warrant CFIUS review voluntarily submit notice
of their transactions for review because of the possible consequence of having a
transaction “un-wound”—even after consummation—if CFIUS independently
decides to investigate the transaction.86
3. Criticisms of the CFIUS Process
One of the criticisms of CFIUS is that it is chaired by the Treasury Depart-
ment, which may put economic concerns above national security concerns.87
However, FINSA was enacted to silence this criticism by adding the Director
of National Security to the committee, thus alleviating concerns that national
security interests would be overlooked during the review process.
Additionally, some SWF investors may view the CFIUS process as unnec-
essarily cumbersome and may start moving money away from the U.S. econ-
omy and into emerging markets with less arduous review processes.88  In fact,
this phenomenon has already begun.  “Many foreign investors have withdrawn
from proposed acquisitions or even divested themselves of completed acquisi-
tions in the face of pressure from CFIUS, the public, or Congress.”89  This
scenario may carry the most potential harm for the U.S. economy.
The U.S. economy could face severe unintended consequences if SWFs
invest elsewhere because CFIUS’s process is too difficult and costly.90  First,
the U.S. could lose much-needed foreign capital, upon which the U.S. economy
is very dependent.91  Second, if SWFs choose to invest in markets with less-
rigid constraints, the U.S. may lose an opportunity to strengthen a political tie
with a country through its investment and subsequent interest in the U.S. econ-
omy’s well-being.92  Third, and perhaps worse than simply losing the SWF
investment, if a SWF moves its money to a country the U.S. considers an
83 Id. § 2(b)(2)(B)(i)(III)(ii).
84 Id. § 2(b)(2)(D)(i).
85 See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-686, DEFENSE TRADE: ENHANCE-
MENTS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXON-FLORIO COULD STRENGTHEN THE LAW’S EFFEC-
TIVENESS 3 (2005), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05686.pdf.
86 Pudner, supra note 63, at 1285 (citations omitted).
87 Georgiev, supra note 66, at 129.
88 Id. at 131.
89 Pudner, supra note 63, at 1288-89 (citing CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CHINA
AND THE CNOOC BID FOR UNOCAL: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 13 (2005), available at http://
www.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33093_20050915.pdf).
90 Georgiev, supra note 66, at 131 (citations omitted).
91 See ISSUES RAISED BY SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, supra note 4, at 19 (discussing
America’s dependence on foreign investment because of America’s large trade deficit).
92 Richard A. Epstein & Amanda M. Rose, The Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds: The
Virtues of Going Slow, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 131 (2009) (citing Solomon W. Polachek
and Carlos Seiglie, Trade, Peace and Democracy: An Analysis of Dyadic Dispute 52-55
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unfriendly nation, the SWF may align its interests against the U.S. and with the
unfriendly nation.93  Fourth, if a SWF invests in a nation lacking strict regula-
tion, CFIUS is unable to address any potential threat the investment could pose
to U.S. national security.  Although it would be able to stop potentially harmful
investments within U.S. borders, when SWFs invest abroad, CFIUS cannot
address the prospective problems with the investments outside U.S. borders.
For example, if a SWF invests in an emerging market without the same type of
stringent checks that CFIUS provides, the SWF may be able to make strategic
purchases and investments in vital commodity producers or reserves that would
not pass CFIUS muster if the SWF were to make them within the U.S.94  This
could indirectly put U.S. national security interests at risk and “affect them
more drastically than SWF activity within the” U.S.95
Aside from the difficulty of the CFIUS process discouraging SWF invest-
ment in the U.S. and the related risks, there is also a risk that SWFs forego U.S.
investment because they perceive the CFIUS process as too politicized.  Before
the FINSA amendment that statutorily changed the CFIUS process, a series of
high-profile, politicized acquisitions eventually resulted in some SWFs being
turned away from their investment.96  Nevertheless, FINSA’s passage did little
to rid the CFIUS process of political involvement and actually provided for
increased Congressional involvement in the CFIUS process.97  Removing polit-
ics from the CFIUS process will depend heavily on how narrowly or broadly
the CFIUS committee decides to construe the term “national security,” as it
relates to “critical infrastructure.”98  Although increased Congressional
involvement may seem like a proper oversight mechanism, it may actually
work to increase politicization of the process because SWFs are now starting to
understand the American way of getting things done—lobbying.  SWFs are
now employing professional lobbying firms to convince Congress not to
oppose their proposed acquisitions in U.S. companies.99  Not only are SWFs
lobbying, but so, too, are private domestic companies who may have protec-
(Institute for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper No. 2170, June 2006), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=915360 (last visited Jan. 11, 2009)).
93 Id. at 132-33.
94 Rose, supra note 39, at 147.
95 Id.
96 See Rose, supra note 39, at 113, for an in-depth discussion about the politics that sur-
rounded British Tire and Rubber’s attempted takeover of Massachusetts-based Norton com-
pany, XO Communications’ blocking of ST Telemedia’s purchase of majority stake in
Global Crossing, a Chinese state-controlled company’s failed bid to take over Unocal Oil
Company, and the Dubai Ports world attempted acquisition of the Peninsular and Oriental
Steam Navigation Company.
97 Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, H.R. 556 § 7, 110th Cong., 121
Stat. 246, 256-59 (2007) (CFIUS must now report to Congress upon the conclusion of trans-
actions that they review as well as provide Annual and detailed reports to Congress concern-
ing the committee’s activities and transactions).
98 See Rose, supra note 39, at 118-19 (Stating that to truly rid the process of politics,
“national security” must be read to cover concerns that are truly national and in fact involve
situations that are related to security, not just politically unfavorable transactions related to a
particular congressional district or particular firm).
99 Pudner, supra note 63, at 1302 (citing Eamon Javers & Dawn Kopecki, Why No Outrage
from Washington: To Fend Off Fiascos Like Last Year’s Failed Dubai Ports World Deal, the
Emirate Called in the Big Guns: The Lobbyists, BUS. WK., Oct. 8, 2007, at 35).
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tionist agendas.100  This type of lobbying activity could potentially denigrate
confidence in the CFIUS regulatory system and may drive SWFs elsewhere.101
Lastly, CFIUS may not be able to vet-out non-national security risks,
which have the potential to affect market volatility.  There are a great number
of transactions that are not evaluated by CFIUS because they do not constitute
“control.”102  Acquisitions are only “covered transactions” if they constitute
“control,” and because many SWFs are currently seeking to acquire minority
interests rather than controlling interests in firms, these transactions are flying
under the CFIUS radar, but could still present a potential threat to the U.S.
economy.103  SWFs may still be able to attain some measure of control even
though their ownership stake would be considered less than the law’s definition
of “control.”104  Therefore, because CFIUS may not be able to vet-out all of the
non-national security risks that accompany a SWF’s investment, the U.S. finan-
cial market may still be subject to risks such as government inefficiency in the
market place, lack of transparency, and SWFs asserting control through their
minority interests—all of which could contribute to market volatility.
In sum, CFIUS has a very difficult job.  It must balance America’s
national security interests while making sure that the U.S. remains open to for-
eign investment and attempting to insulate the process from politicization so
that the U.S. will continue to see a positive influx of foreign investment on
which it is heavily reliant at this time.  How this snake-charmer’s balance plays
out in the future will have a lot to do with how the future of both the U.S. and
the global economies are shaped.
B. International Regulatory Responses to Sovereign Wealth Funds105
CFIUS may be able to effectively protect the U.S. interests when SWFs
invest domestically; however, the U.S. Treasury Department has recognized
100 See Rose, supra note 39, at 113-16 (describing four transactions affected for political
reasons that may not have had national security implications).
101 But see id. at 117 (explaining how the CFIUS “Evergreen” provision may provide some
certainty and political insulation to SWF investments because the only two ways a previ-
ously approved CFIUS transaction may be unwound is if a party to the transaction provided
false or misleading information during the review or if the mitigation agreement is breached
intentionally).
102 31 C.F.R. § 800.204(c) (2008).
103 Evan Bayh, Op-Ed., Time for Sovereign Wealth Rules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2008, A26
(speaking about how CFIUS review is only triggered if the investment exceeds 10% of
controlling interest).
104 Id.
105 The full breadth of the international regulatory response to SWFs is beyond the scope of
this article.  However, it is important to touch upon it briefly because the U.S. is advocating
heavily for the acceptance of these international solutions in order to help control the effects
of how SWFs shape the global economy outside of America’s borders.  For a fuller
exploration of the international response and the official document that lays out the purpose
of the Santiago Principles, see Int’l Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds [IWG]
Establishing Meeting, Apr. 30-May 1, 2008, Sovereign Wealth Funds Generally Accepted
Principals and Practices: “Santiago Principals,” (Oct. 2008), [hereinafter Int’l Working
Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds], http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.
pdf; see also Rose, supra note 39, at 147 (stating that a holistic approach in regulating SWFs
may be enhanced by voluntary adoption of the Santiago Principals); see also Angel Gurria,
OECD Sec’y-Gen., OECD Declaration on Sovereign Wealth Funds and Recipient Country
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that controlling SWFs domestically may not be enough.  For this reason, the
U.S. helped play a role in developing the international response to SWFs.106
In October of 2008, twenty-six countries with SWFs collaborated under
the supervision of the IMF and came to a resolution on a set of Generally
Accepted Principles and Practices (“GAPP”) to which SWFs should abide.107
These principles and practices were dubbed the “Santiago Principles.”108  The
fact that twenty-six countries participated in making the Santiago Principles
may be indicative of how widely adopted these principles will become in the
international community.109  Furthermore, wide-ranging international adher-
ence to these principles would help the U.S. control macro-economic and
national security risks that SWFs may cause by making politically strategic
investments in less-regulated markets across the world.110  If a majority of
countries adopted these principles and received international support to back
them up through the IMF, then SWFs would not likely have a variety of finan-
cially viable markets wherein they could assert interests other than purely eco-
nomic interests.  Thus, not every country that accepts SWFs into their markets
would need to adopt overly onerous regulations to control them.  Furthermore,
the countries adhering to GAPP may also have the assurance that SWFs will
behave like the good institutional investors that they are touted to be and will
not withdraw their money for less-regulated markets because the choices of
markets that do not adhere to the Santiago Principles will be small and perhaps
more politically risky.
Additionally, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (“OECD”) has laid out a framework of voluntary best practices and prin-
ciples; however, the OECD’s principles are aimed at the countries in which
SWFs invest.111  Recognizing that investment is a two-way street, the OECD
has laid out principles to which investee countries should adhere so that the
global economy will continue to remain open to SWF investment.  The OECD
principles ask investee nations to live up to the same types of standards applied
to SWFs.112  Thus, countries that adopt the voluntary Santiago Principles are
likely to adopt the best practices and principles laid out by the OECD.  Since
wide-ranging adoption of the Santiago Principles would make it difficult for
SWFs to invest in countries where they could carry out ulterior motives, wide-
Policies, (Oct. 11, 2008), [hereinafter OECD Declaration], http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/
23/41456730.pdf.
106 See Lowery, supra note 2 (stating that multi-lateral agreed upon principals of best prac-
tices is the most appropriate international response to the rise of SWFs).
107 Int’l Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 105, at 4 (the Santiago
Principles are noted for working to alleviate one of the major problems with SWFs:
transparency).
108 GAPP was dubbed the Santiago Principles because the final meeting of all twenty-six
countries occurred in Santiago, Chile.
109 Robert M. Kimmitt, Deputy Sec’y, U.S. Treas., Statement on Int’l Working Group
Agreement on Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Sovereign Wealth Funds
(Oct. 11, 2008), [hereinafter Kimmit Statement on IGW Agreement], available at http://
www.treas.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1197.aspx (stating that he was confident
that these principles will support a stable global financial system and reduce protectionism).
110 See Rose, supra note 39, at 147.
111 OECD Declaration, supra note 105, at 2.
112 See id.
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ranging adherence to OECD principles will also make it difficult for investee
nations to use national security excuses as a means of protectionism.  This is
because SWFs will simply take their investment capital to a nation that abides
by OECD principles, thereby assuring a greater chance of fair treatment.
However, there is a drawback here as well.  The Santiago and OECD prin-
ciples are only voluntary sets of best practices.113  The hope is that the Santiago
Principles will create “a natural incentive among funds to hold themselves to
high[er] standards[ ]” and relieve countries of the need to take “draconian”
measures to regulate SWFs.114  Another hope is that OECD principles will be
“guideposts against which countries that receive sovereign wealth investments
can measure their inward investment policies”115 and maintain an open and
non-discriminatory investment climate that welcomes SWFs and assures them
of the same types of protections that investee nations seek.
Whether wide-ranging adoption of these principles occurs, remains to be
seen.  If the international backing of these principles is not strong enough to
encourage a substantial number of countries to adopt and enforce these princi-
ples, then it is likely that their effect on how SWFs are regulated will be negli-
gible and, in some cases, even harmful to promoting a market open to
international investment.116
With the preceding background on the current issues affecting SWF
investment and the corresponding regulations both in the U.S. and abroad, we
can now discuss Nevada’s gaming regulatory response to SWFs investment.117
IV. THE NEVADA GAMING REGULATORY RESPONSE TO
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INVESTMENT
Much like the customers who patronize state casinos, the gaming industry
has always been a place where visionary risk-takers may find reward.118  Thus,
it should come as no surprise that when SWFs started investing in riskier,
113 See Int’l Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 105, at 5.
114 Lowery, supra note 2 (emphasis added) (stating that SWFs will be aware of their reputa-
tions and thus may adhere to the best practices in order to protect their reputations).
115 Kimmitt Statement on IGW Agreement, supra note 109.
116 See Epstein & Rose, supra note 92, at 134 (claiming that erecting any more barriers to
SWF investment other than the current U.S. regulations may push SWF investment away,
“even if they are just a self-policing but diplomatically coerced code of ‘best practices’”).
117 In 2008, the Nevada Gaming Commission found Infinity World, one of Dubai World’s
SWFs, suitable to become a voting shareholder in MGM. NGC Dubai World Suitability
Hearing, supra note 3.  In late 2009, the Nevada Gaming Commission found Infinity World
suitable to become 50-50 partners with MGM Mirage on its City Center project. Special
Hearing on the Application for a Finding of Suitability as a 50% Member of City Center
Holdings, LLC, Before the Nev. Gaming Comm’n (Nov. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Special Hear-
ing on City Center Holdings].
118 Interview with Dr. R. Keith Schwer, Dir. of Ctr. for Bus. and Econ. Research, Faculty
Member, Univ. of Nev., Las Vegas Econ. Dep’t, in Las Vegas, Nev. (Apr. 17, 2009) [herein-
after Schwer Interview].  Dr. Schwer is recognized as an authority on the business and eco-
nomic environment of Las Vegas and the state of Nevada.  He stated that many doubted
casino entrepreneur Steve Wynn when he opened the Mirage because it needed to make $1
million a day to break even. “Well it did very well thank you, it made $2 million a
day. . .people that have been risk takers here have generally done well in the past.” Id.
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higher-yield investments,119 they would eventually take their money to the Sil-
ver State’s gaming industry.
Since 1861 and the advent of legalized gaming in Nevada, the gaming
regulatory system has been forced to evolve with the changing times in order to
ensure that the industry, with which the state’s economy is tied, remains via-
ble.120  Luckily, two previous evolutions equipped the gaming regulatory sys-
tem with the experience necessary to deal with the entrance of SWF investment
into the industry.
The first of these evolutions was the Corporate Gaming Act of 1967, and
its subsequent revision in 1969, which created a licensing and regulatory frame-
work for publicly-traded corporations and enabled them to invest in casino
resorts.121  The second evolution was the introduction of foreign public com-
pany investment and foreign individual investment into the gaming industry,
which created a licensing and regulatory framework that paved the way for
other foreign investors to access the gaming market.122  After Nevada
lawmakers and gaming regulators adeptly handled these two evolutions, the
Nevada gaming control system was well-equipped to respond to and thrive in a
modern investment climate wherein SWFs have now taken a prominent role in
the global economy.
As it currently stands, Nevada gaming is a highly regulated industry, and
just like CFIUS, Nevada’s gaming control system is tasked with balancing the
need to control the industry and protect Nevada’s economy while also main-
taining an open investment environment that promotes the freedom necessary
to let it flourish.123  However, “[i]f you want to play in our sand-box, then you
have to play by our rules.”124
A. Composition and Structure of the Nevada Gaming Control System
Nevada has a two-tiered regulatory control system.125  The first tier is the
State Gaming Control Board (“GCB”), and the second tier is the Gaming Com-
119 Edward F. Greene & Brian A. Yeager, Sovereign Wealth Funds—A Measured Assess-
ment, 3 CAP. MKT. L. J. 247, 257 (2008).
120 LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS, NEVADA GAMING LAW 3 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining that it
has taken over 60 years to achieve balance between control and freedom within the system).
121 See id. at 25-27.  This evolution started with Howard Hughes’ move into Nevada and it
ushered in the era of corporate ownership in the gaming industry; it also helped legitimize
the gaming industry. Id. at 25.
122 See id. at 219-26.  The approval of the first foreign public company, Carma Limited,
happened contemporaneously with Assembly Bill 655, which formally recognized the power
the Gaming Commission had to approve foreign licensure. Id. at 219-24.  The second for-
eign licensure that occurred in 1985 was for Genji Yasuda to purchase the Aladdin hotel. Id.
at 224-26.
123 Id. at 219-20 (citing “the flexibility of Nevada’s gaming laws and the innovative spirit of
the state’s gaming regulators [that] made approval [of foreign ownership of and investment
in Nevada casinos] possible.”) Id. at 119.
124 Interview with Pat Wynn, Deputy Chief of Investigations, Nev. Gaming Control Bd., in
Las Vegas, Nev. (May 12, 2009) [hereinafter Wynn Interview] (explaining that if you want
to conduct gaming activity in Nevada then you are going to have to abide by the strict
suitability standards of transparency and accountability set out by the State of Nevada).
125 LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS, supra note 120, at 29.
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mission (“Commission”).126  Both tiers are public policy driven.127  The policy
mandates guiding the two regulatory bodies are contained in a number of dif-
ferent statutes and are broken down according to which area of regulation the
statutes affect.128  Nevada Revised Statute section 463.0129(1) provides a sum-
mary of the overall public policy that should guide all regulatory decisions.129
Among other things, section 463.0129(1) indicates the vital importance of the
gaming industry to the economy of the state and its inhabitants, reflects how the
future growth of the gaming industry is dependent on the public’s trust and
confidence in the gaming industry, and calls for strict regulation “[t]o ensure
that gaming is conducted honestly, competitively, and free of [any] criminal or
corruptive elements[.]”130  Therefore, any decision concerning gaming made by
either regulatory body must reflect the public policy mandates.131  The legisla-
ture granted both regulatory bodies broad powers to ensure that these policy
mandates are carried out.132
1. Tier 1 – The Nevada Gaming Control Board
The GCB is a full-time agency that serves the gaming industry as both a
police officer133 and tax collector.134  The GCB is a three-member decision-
making panel appointed to four-year terms by the governor.135  All three mem-
bers must have different skill sets.136  The chairman is required to “have five
years of administrative experience in public or business administration.”137
“Another member must be a certified public accountant with five years’ experi-
ence[,] or be an expert in the fields of corporate finance and auditing, general
finance, gaming, or economics.”138  The last member must have experience in
gaming, investigations, law enforcement, or law.139  This complementary skill
set helps the GCB work together in interpreting the investigative reports given
126 Id.
127 STATE GAMING CONTROL BD. AND NEV. GAMING COMM’N, GAMING REGULATION IN
NEVADA: AN UPDATE 12 (2006) [hereinafter GAMING REGULATION IN NEVADA] available at
http://gaming.nv.gov/documents/pdf/gaming_regulation_nevada.pdf.
128 E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.489 (1975) (contains the public policies that should guide
gaming regulators when dealing with corporations). See also, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 463.563
(2009) (limited partnerships), 463.573 (1993) (limited liability companies), 462.622 (1987)
(corporate acquisitions).
129 GAMING REGULATION IN NEVADA, supra note 127, at 1 (citations omitted).
130 NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.0129(1) (1999).
131 GAMING REGULATION IN NEVADA, supra note 127, at 1.
132 Telephone interview with Dennis Neilander, Chairman, Nev. Gaming Control Bd., in
Reno, Nev. (April 27, 2009) [hereinafter Neilander Interview].
133 Nev. Gaming Comm’n Reg. 5.040 (2010) (In pertinent part, “[t]he [GCB] is charged by
law with the duty of observing the conduct of all licensees to [ensure] that licenses shall not
be held by unqualified or disqualified persons or unsuitable persons or persons whose opera-
tions are conducted in an unsuitable manner.”); see also, LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS, supra
note 120, at 29.
134 LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS, supra note 120, at 29.
135 GAMING REGULATION IN NEVADA, supra note 127, at 7.
136 LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS, supra note 120, at 30-31.
137 Id. at 30 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.040(4) (1981)).
138 Id. at 30-31 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.040(5) (1981)).
139 NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.040(6) (1981); see also LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS, supra note
120, at 31.
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to them by the various agencies housed within the GCB.  In addition, the GCB
is tasked with making informed recommendations to the Commission based on
the GCB’s investigation into the qualifications of each applicant.140
There are some key checks on the GCB that aim to make sure that appli-
cants are treated fairly in the licensure process.  The first check is intended to
make the GCB an apolitical office.  GCB members are to be appointed based
on their qualifications and not upon partisan politics.141  Therefore, “no [GCB]
member may be a political party official[,] . . . a member of a political conven-
tion or party committee.”142  Furthermore, “[n]o state legislator or elected state
official may serve on the [GCB].”143  The second check is intended to ensure
impartiality.144  Therefore, “[GCB] members may not have [any pecuniary]
interest in any business holding a gaming license or do [any] business with
[any] person holding a gaming license.”145  An additional check designed to
control impartiality is that the governor cannot remove a GCB member during
his or her term except due to misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in
office.146  To date, Nevada has never had a member of the GCB or Commis-
sion accused of illegal conduct.147  Other jurisdictions that regulate gaming
cannot say the same.148
Lastly, the GCB has a staff of about 450 individuals.149  Sixty-four of
them are investigators with various skill sets.150  The staff is split into six divi-
sions: Administration, Audit, Enforcement, Investigations, Tax and License,
and Technology.151  All six divisions assist the GCB and Commission in their
regulatory and law enforcement duties.
2. Tier 2 – The Nevada Gaming Commission
The Commission is a part-time, five-member lay body appointed to stag-
gered four-year terms by the governor.152  The Commission is primarily
responsible for acting upon the recommendations of the GCB in matters relat-
140 NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.1405(1), (3) (2003).
141 NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.040(3) (1981); see also LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS, supra note
120, at 31 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.040(3) (1981)).
142 NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.060(2) (1997); see also LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS, supra note
120, at 31 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.060(2) (1997)).
143 NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.040(2) (1981); see also LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS, supra note
120, at 31 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.040(2) (1981)).
144 LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS, supra note 120, at 31.
145 NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.060(3) (1997); see also LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS, supra note
120, at 31 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.060(3) (1997)).
146 NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.050(3) (2007); see LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS, supra note 120,
at 31-32 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.050(3) (2007)).
147 GAMING REGULATION AND GAMING LAW IN NEVADA AS REMEMBERED BY ROBERT D.
FAISS 6 (R.T. King ed., 2006).
148 Id.
149 GAMING REGULATION IN NEVADA, supra note 127, at 7.
150 Wynn Interview, supra note 124.
151 NEVADA GAMING CONTROL BD, NOTICE #2011-07, MERGING OF THE BOARD’S INVESTI-
GATIONS AND CORPORATE SECURITIES DIVISIONS (Feb. 8, 2011) available at http://gaming.
nv.gov/industry_ltrs/industry_ltr_258.pdf.
152 Id. at 35; GAMING REGULATION IN NEVADA, supra note 127, at 6.
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ing to licensing.153  However, the Commission is the state’s final administra-
tive authority and may accept, deny, or modify the recommendations of the
GCB on licensing matters, as well as revoke or suspend any gaming license.154
Additionally, the Commission is charged with enacting, adopting, or repealing
gaming regulations to help it and the GCB carry out their tasks in accordance
with Nevada’s policies, objectives, and statutory purposes.155
In order to ensure that applicants are treated fairly throughout the process,
the Commission is subject to the same checks as the GCB.  Members of the
Commission cannot be members of any committee or political convention, can-
not be members of the legislature or hold an elected office, and may not be
actively engaged in or hold a direct pecuniary interest in gaming activities.156
There is also an additional check; to ensure that no single political party domi-
nates the Commission, there can be no more than three members with the same
political affiliation at any one time.157
B. The Licensure Process: Nevada’s Gatekeeper to the Gaming Industry
Unlike the CFIUS process where transactions are only examined if certain
criteria of “control” are met and national security interests are involved,158 the
licensing process in Nevada serves as the gatekeeper to transacting any form of
gaming business in the state and sometimes even any form of business that is
closely related to the Nevada gaming industry.  The GCB and Commission may
exercise broad statutory authority to require the licensure of any individual or
entity that:159 (1) has an influence (ownership/control) over any gaming opera-
tions within the state;160 (2) shares in gaming revenues with a licensee;161 (3) is
a lender to a gaming licensee;162 or (4) is the owner of the land upon which
gaming is conducted.163
153 GAMING REGULATION IN NEVADA, supra note 127, at 6.
154 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.1405(4) (2003); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.220 (1985)
(emphasis added).
155 GAMING REGULATION IN NEVADA, supra note 127, at 6.
156 NEV. REV. STAT § 463.023(2)-(3) (1961).
157 Id. § 463.023(4).
158 See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(a) (2006 & Supp. I 2007).
159 GAMING REGULATION IN NEVADA, supra note 127, at 10.
160 Id. There are a myriad of laws under Title 41, Chapter 463, which covers gaming regu-
lation in the state of Nevada.  The statutes contained therein define the Commission and
GCB’s broad authority to require an individual or entity to obtain a license if they are exer-
cising any type of ownership/control or any similar influence.  However, the statutes are
situation specific and will be referenced individually as they apply.
161 GAMING REGULATION IN NEVADA, supra note 127, at 10; see NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 463.167(1) (2007).
162 GAMING REGULATION IN NEVADA, supra note 127, at 10; see NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 463.300 (1959).  A casino cannot borrow money for a gaming operation without comply-
ing with Nevada Gaming Regulations.
163 GAMING REGULATION IN NEVADA, supra note 127, at 10; NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 463.162(1)(c) (2009), 463.167(1) (2007).  “An unlicensed landlord may not receive rental
payments based upon a percentage of the earnings or profits from the lessee’s gaming reve-
nues.” LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS, supra note 120, at 47 (citations omitted).  Fixed rental
payments are acceptable.  However, if the rental payments are fixed, the gaming authorities
reserve the discretion to require the landlord to obtain a license; see, NEV. REV. STAT.
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1. The Standard that Must be Met
The standard for attaining a gaming license and conducting business
within the gaming industry can be boiled down to two over-arching concepts:
(1) suitability of the individual or individuals in charge of the corporation; and
(2) suitability of the source of funds with which the gaming establishment is
going to be operated.164
Gaming license applicants bear the burden of proving their qualification to
receive a license.165  Therefore, “[y]ou are guilty until proven innocent.”166
Both regulatory bodies assess the applicants’ qualifications based on the broad
discretionary powers granted to them by state law, regulations, and
precedent.167
The criteria that both the GCB and Commission evaluate are wide-ranging
and very discretionary.  Regulators will first look at the character of the indi-
vidual applicant.168  There are a whole host of factors that, if unsatisfied, will
likely affect an applicant’s suitability evaluation and may result in application
denial.169  The test evaluates seven criteria under which the Commission might
find an applicant unsuitable:
(1) conviction of a felony or misdemeanor involving violence, gambling or moral
turpitude;
(2) an unexplained pattern of arrests exists showing a lack of due regard for the law;
(3) a failure to prove he is a person with integrity and good character;
(4) association or membership in organized crime;
(5) associations with individuals who are deemed unsuitable;170
(6) prior unsuitable operation of a casino
(7) any conduct constituting a threat to the public health, safety, morals, good order
and general welfare of the state of Nevada and its gaming industry, or any conduct
that would reflect discredit upon the State of Nevada or its gaming industry.171
Although this is a rather extensive list of things that could potentially dis-
qualify an applicant, there are even more factors that the GCB and Commission
look at when determining an applicant’s suitability.  Regulators will also evalu-
ate the applicant’s financing sources and the suitability of those funds in order
§ 463.162(6) (2009) (providing if the landlord is ever found unsuitable the lease must be
terminated without liability to the casino).
164 Interview with Gregg P. Schatzman, former Senior Investigative Agent, Nev. State
Gaming Control Bd., in Las Vegas, Nev. (Apr. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Schatzman Interview]
(explaining that the “standard is the same now as it was then”); see also, Nev. Gaming
Comm’n. Reg. 3.090 (1975).
165 Nev. Gaming Comm’n. Reg. 4.010(2) (1973), 5.040 (2010).  The standard is embedded
in both regulations.
166 Schatzman Interview, supra note 164.
167 LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS, supra note 120, at 56.
168 Id. at 57.
169 The character suitability standards are codified at NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.170(2) (2009)
and Nev. Gaming Comm’n. Reg. 3.090(1) (1975).
170 The Fifth and Sixth criteria for suitability derive from a period when Nevada gaming
regulators sought to rid the industry of organized crime’s influence.  For an interesting arti-
cle on the topic, see Leslie Nin˜o Fidance, The Mob Never Ran Vegas, 13 GAMING. L. REV.
& ECON. 27 (2009).
171 NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.170(2) (2009); Nev. Gaming Comm’n. Reg. 3.090(1) (1975); see
also LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS, supra note 120, at 57.
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to make sure that the funds are not derived from criminal or hidden sources and
that the funding for the entire operation is adequate.172  Moreover, an appli-
cant’s business competence will be evaluated.173  Additional evaluation factors
include: the suitability of the location; the ownership of the location; multiple
licensing criteria, if applicable; and lastly, the applicant’s conduct during the
investigatory process.174  It is important to note that the applicant’s conduct
during the investigation weighs very heavily in the regulatory bodies’ evalua-
tion of the applicant because the Nevada gaming industry mandates 100%
transparency during the investigatory process.175
2. The Investigatory Process
The investigatory process is where the bulk of the initial work is done to
determine an applicant’s suitability based on the factors listed above.  Back-
ground investigators have very broad powers and can inspect premises, as well
as demand access to personal and business records for the purposes of auditing
or examination.176  For businesses,
the [GCB] will look at patterns of litigation to see if the applicant company uses
litigation to get out of paying vendors and things of that nature.  Furthermore, the
[GCB] will examine all of the company’s business records, its sources of capital, and
whether or not it has operated in a regulatory environment before.  If so, how did
they perform in that environment?177
There are no limits on how far back investigators may search, and investi-
gators will likely uncover any discrepancies in the information the applicant
provides.178  One gaming expert—having experienced what a top-level federal
governmental security clearance process was like while working as a White
House presidential assistant—remarked that a typical gaming license investiga-
172 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.170(3)(b) (2009); Nev. Gaming Comm’n. Reg. 3.090(2)
(1975).
173 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.170(3)(a) (2009); Nev. Gaming Comm’n. Reg. 3.090(1)(c)
(1975).
174 NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.339 (2003) (mandating full and true disclosure of all information
requested from the applicant by gaming regulatory authorities consistent with the state’s
public policy and the duties of the regulatory system).
175 Wynn Interview, supra note 124 (“our system operates in the sunlight, whatever we ask
for, we want it provided because we have certain disclosure standards that need to be met
before an evaluation of suitability can occur.”).
176 See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 463.140(2)-(4) (1995), 463.1405(2) (2003); see also Nev. Gam-
ing Comm’n Reg. 4.010 (1973).  The statutes and regulations grant investigators very broad
authority to look into almost any aspect of a person’s life or business no matter how intrusive
it may seem.
177 Interview with Mark A. Clayton, Esq., former member, Nev. Gaming Control Bd., in
Las Vegas, Nev. (Apr. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Clayton Interview] (discussing the types of
factors that the regulators will look at when investigating businesses for suitability).  Mark
Clayton served on the GCB when it approved the Dubai World SWF’s stock purchase of
MGM Mirage.
178 LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS, supra note 120, at 76.  The investigators are looking at
what the applicant provides, but also what the applicant is trying to hide.  Unlike criminal
actions, license applications are not subject to the same constitutional rules of exclusion. Id.
at 78.
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tion “is far more extensive and intrusive than the highest U.S. security clear-
ance investigation.”179
Knowing all the factors Nevada gaming regulators take into account when
determining whether an applicant is suitable to conduct business within the
industry, it is now time to analyze how the system actually responded to SWF
investment.
V. NEVADA’S ABILITY TO NAVIGATE THE UNIQUE REGULATORY PROBLEMS
PRESENTED BY SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INVESTMENT –
AN EXAMINATION OF DUBAI WORLD’S PURCHASE
OF MGM MIRAGE STOCK
On November 20, 2008, the Commission, acting on the recommendation
of the GCB, found Dubai World suitable to purchase up to 20% of MGM
Mirage’s (“MGM”) stock.180  By examining this transaction, it will be seen that
the Nevada gaming industry’s comprehensive and time-tested regulatory sys-
tem has allowed Nevada to receive the benefits of SWF investment, while
effectively mitigating the accompanying risks.  Additionally, Nevada’s exam-
ple may also be a useful guide for other state industries across the U.S. looking
to open their economies to SWFs.
A. Welcoming the Knight in Shining Armor
As previously mentioned, the gaming regulatory system has the duty to
control the gaming industry while simultaneously ensuring the industry is
allowed the freedom to become an openly competitive market that welcomes
both domestic and foreign investment.181  Its job is just as important to
Nevada’s economy as CFIUS’ job is to national security because gaming is the
state’s primary industry.182  Should the regulatory system fail to block unsuita-
ble investors from the Nevada economy, the consequences could be dire to the
300,000 people who are directly employed by the industry and the thousands
more whose jobs depend on supplying the industry.183
The Dubai World SWF (“DW”) has the potential to provide many benefits
that both the Nevada economy and MGM are in need of at this unprecedented
time of economic stress.  One of the extolled benefits of SWF investment is
that they are long-term stable investors that have the potential to promote finan-
cial stability.184  The GCB specifically looked into this factor.185  After con-
179 Id. at 75 (quoting Robert D. Faiss, one of the world’s foremost authorities on gaming
law).
180 See NGC Dubai World Suitability Hearing, supra note 3; see also Hearing on the Appli-
cation of Dubai World for a Finding of Suitability as Beneficial Owners or Shareholders of
the Voting Securities of MGM Mirage, Before the State Gaming Control Bd. (Nov. 5, 2008)
[hereinafter GCB Dubai World Suitability Hearing].
181 LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS, supra note 120, at 3.
182 See GAMING REGULATION IN NEVADA, supra note 127, at 10.
183 See NEV. RESORT ASS’N, THE FACTS ABOUT GAMING IN NEVADA 1 (Feb. 2011) availa-
ble at http://nevadaresorts.org/docs/factbook/NRA-2011-Factbook.pdf.
184 McCormick, supra note 25.
185 Clayton Interview, supra note 177.  Because Dubai World’s SWF investment was the
first foreign SWF to ever go through the licensure process, Clayton personally participated in
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ducting thorough investigations of DW’s business records and other investment
holdings around the world, the GCB found “[DW] to be a long-term stable
investor investing in a long-time player within the gaming industry.”186  As of
November 2008, DW had purchased 9.4% of MGM’s stock and became a 50%
partner in MGM’s City Center project, which was the largest private invest-
ment in U.S. history.187  DW’s contributions totaled in excess of six billion
dollars.188  This amount of capital investment is indicative of DW’s long-term
investment interest in MGM.189  Furthermore, DW’s investment is also a
much-needed lifeline for the local economy; City Center created 12,000 gam-
ing and hospitality jobs190—not to mention the thousands of construction jobs
it fueled.191
Another possible benefit of SWF investment is the concept of reciprocity,
i.e., an opportunity for U.S. firms to generate new businesses in the investor
country.192  This benefit does not occur with all SWF investment, nor does U.S.
policy mandate reciprocity.193  However, the investment relationship between
DW and MGM does include reciprocal investment.194  Plans were announced
at the November 2008 GCB hearing for MGM to develop and manage two
nongaming, destination resorts in Abu Dhabi and Dubai that will carry the
MGM Grand and Bellagio brands respectively.195
Lastly, SWF investment brings along with it the opportunity to introduce
new business methods into economies, promote healthy business competition,
create innovation, lower prices, and enhance customer variety.196  The partner-
ship between DW and MGM seeks to do just this.  Both companies want to
leverage each other’s knowledge of the hospitality industry because both enti-
ties are well-recognized in the international economy for hospitality.
Did this investment have a strategic backdrop?  Yes, but not the kind you
would think.  Dubai World wasn’t seeking to gain control of MGM or sabotage
the gaming industry; it is a mutually beneficial strategy.  MGM wants to diver-
the front-end of the investigation. Id.  GCB members do not normally participate in the
investigative process and his participation in the early stages of the investigation is indicative
of the emphasis the GCB placed in making sure the process was thorough and complete. Id.
186 Id.
187 GCB Dubai World Suitability Hearing, supra note 180, at 7 (statement to the GCB from
former MGM Mirage CEO, J. Terrance Lanni).
188 Id.  In late 2009, the Commission found DW suitable for licensure as a 50-50 partner in
City Center thereby ratifying the parties’ agreement and solidifying DW’s stake in the
Nevada gaming industry. See Special Hearing on City Center Holdings, supra note 117.
189 Id. at 26-27.
190 Amanda Finnegan, City Center Employees Receive Uniforms, Gear up for Opening, LAS
VEGAS SUN (Oct. 29, 2009 2:05 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/oct/29/
citycenter-employees-receive-uniforms-gear-opening.
191 Arnold M. Knightly, Safety Issues Raised, LAS VEGAS REV. J. (Sept. 26, 2008 5:22 PM),
http://www.lvrj.com/news/26371359.html (stating that the City Center project employed
over 7,700 construction workers).
192 Rose, supra note 39, at 92-93 (citation omitted).
193 Kimmitt, supra note 6, at 128.
194 GCB Dubai World Suitability Hearing, supra note 180, at 7-9 (statement to the GCB
from former MGM Mirage CEO, J. Terrance Lanni).
195 Id. at 8.
196 McCormick, supra note 25.
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sify itself by creating resorts all around the world and Dubai World wanted to
invest in the gaming industry.197
Thus, DW’s investment into the Nevada gaming industry has the potential
to introduce new hospitality standards and business methods into both Nevada
and the United Arab Emirates.  Furthermore, now that City Center is open for
business, it has created jobs, added variety for the consumer, and contributes to
healthy business competition in Nevada’s gaming industry.
B. Fending Off Mr. Hyde
Nevada gaming regulators were well apprised of the current issues sur-
rounding SWF investment before DW sought entrance into the gaming indus-
try.198  In order to harness the benefits that accompany SWF investment and to
mitigate the perceived risks of SWF investment, DW would have to pass
Nevada’s stringent standards of suitability.199  However, some aspects of the
investigation into DW were different because the GCB had to add a third tier to
the investigation.200  Not only did the character of the individuals that control
the SWF and the suitability of their funds have to be investigated, but the Dubai
government also needed to be investigated because of its potential to control
the investment.201  It is important to note that DW was not discriminated
against because it was a SWF; they were put through the exact same investiga-
tion and asked to meet the exact same standards of suitability that all potential
investors, whether foreign or domestic, are asked to meet.202  Nevada’s actions
of non-discrimination, progressive liberalization, and unilateral liberalization
are similar to OECD’s general investment policy principles regarding the treat-
ment of foreign investors, which include SWFs.203
1. The Risk of Government Control
In order to mitigate the state capitalism that accompanies SWF invest-
ment, the GCB investigated all of the individuals with decision-making power
in Infinity World, DW’s SWF investment arm.  The GCB needed to be sure
there was separation of direct government control from the fund and that it
would be able to acquire jurisdiction over any individuals with the ability to
control the fund.204  Additionally, the GCB made sure to address an added
wrinkle of government control.  DW is a decreed company, which means it was
created by Sheikh Mohammed, the ruler of Dubai, who retains authority to
197 Neilander Interview, supra note 132.  Neilander recommended approval for DW’s suita-
bility as an investor in the Nevada gaming industry. Id.
198 Clayton Interview, supra note 177 (“[T]here are the common perceptions about SWFs
and then there are the realities. The realities are what need to be investigated.”).
199 See GAMING REGULATION IN NEVADA, supra note 127, at 10 (“Nevada requires approv-
als and licenses for transactions which affect ownership and/or control of any gaming opera-
tion in the State and for any individual who could exert any similar influence.”).
200 Neilander Interview, supra note 132.
201 Id.  In SWF investigations, one must add the third tier and investigate the government
and the corporate entity that the government has formed to hold the investment, as well as
the individuals that will control the entity. Id.
202 Wynn Interview, supra note 124.
203 See OECD Declaration supra note 105, at 3.
204 Wynn Interview, supra note 124.
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change the individuals in power and control over DW at any time.205  Because
of a decreed company’s nature and its potential to be amended by Sheikh
Mohammed, the GCB exercised its broad discretion and requested that DW’s
Chairman and Chief Financial Officer file suitability applications in order to
retain jurisdiction over any possible decision-makers in the company.206  Juris-
diction over a SWF’s decision-making body is key because it ensures that the
Commission has the power to regulate the SWF as necessary to protect the best
interests of the state.207
Furthermore, DW submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Gaming Con-
trol Act and Commission regulations and waived any claims to sovereign
immunity in the event that a regulatory inquiry or disciplinary action should
occur.  This ensures that the Commission will be able to carry out its regulatory
duty upon the SWF without having to fight the issue of sovereign immunity
first.208
An additional check against governments pursuing geo-political goals via
SWF investment is one that all applicants must face: the GCB’s intrusive209
and costly suitability investigation.210  The costs of suitability investigation are
particularly high for foreign applicants, not because of discriminatory reasons
but because the logistics of a foreign investigation increase the costs.211  There-
fore, it is unlikely that a SWF will undergo this cumbersome procedure for
reasons besides seeking return on its investment.212
The last factor scrutinized by Nevada gaming regulators was the percent-
age of shares in MGM that DW was seeking.  At the time the GCB found DW
suitable to purchase MGM stock, Kirk Kerkorian owned about 50% of MGM’s
shares, which made him MGM’s largest shareholder.213  Therefore, any con-
cerns about DW imposing its political or strategic will through shareholder
influence could be effectively mitigated by Kerkorian’s large amount of
shares.214  As long as DW’s total share of MGM stock remains considerably
below other large investors, concerns about the SWF’s potential strategic con-
trol will likely remain mitigated in the future.
By taking all these steps to ensure the separation of government-meddling
in the fund, the Nevada gaming control system may have potentially wrought a
way to stave off any political or strategic goals that SWFs may seek when
investing in U.S. companies. However, there are still other risks that come
205 GCB Dubai World Suitability Hearing, supra note 180, at 41-43 (Dubai World was
created by Decree No. 3 in 2006 and is not subject to Dubai’s commercial federal laws).
206 Id.
207 Neilander Interview, supra note 132.
208 Id.
209 LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS, supra note 120, at 75.
210 See id. at 225.
211 Id. at 74.
212 Clayton Interview, supra note 177.
213 Howard Stutz, Kerkorian to Step Down From MGM Resorts Board, LAS VEGAS REV. J.,
Apr. 15, 2011, at 1D.  Kerkorian “controlled more than 50 percent of MGM Resorts in 2009,
until a stock offering reduced his stake.” Id. at 2D.  As of April 2011, Kerkorian still holds a
27% share of MGM stock. Id. at 1D.
214 Clayton Interview, supra note 177.
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along with SWF investment, and the gaming regulatory system had to deal with
those as well.
2. Lack of Transparency
One of the major problems with SWF investment is the lack of trans-
parency and uniform rules of disclosure.215  In Nevada, participation in the
gaming industry is a privilege and not a right.216  Therefore, if applicants—not
just SWFs—do not comply with Nevada gaming regulators’ requests during the
investigation and throughout the tenure of the investment, then it is likely that
they will not receive a license to conduct gaming business in the state or that
the Commission will revoke their license.217  Nevada’s gaming industry
requires total transparency so that an evaluation of the applicant’s suitability
can be determined.218  Some commentators have postulated that more regula-
tion on top of the already onerous CFIUS federal regulation will push SWFs
away.219  Nevertheless, Nevada gaming regulators remain true to their policy of
protecting the industry and the inhabitants of the state.220  So, even if this regu-
latory stance pushes other SWF investors away “then that is just the way it is.
We are not going to lessen our standards.”221  This stringent policy has served
the state well in ensuring that gaming is conducted in an open and honest envi-
ronment and has even helped rid Nevada of corruptive elements that had seeped
their way into the gaming industry in the past.222
A good mitigating factor to the regulatory bodies’ tough stance on trans-
parency is their commitment to conduct business in an apolitical223 and non-
discriminatory fashion.224  Thus, SWFs seeking to conduct business in the
gaming industry can be assured that they will only be held to the same stringent
standards to which everyone else is held.225
C. Other Concerns About Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment
Lack of transparency and fear of government investment motives that are
not economically based are some of the major concerns that SWF investment
presents.  Nevada’s gaming control system has acted cogently to contain those
risks.  However, there are also some other risks that SWFs present, and the
regulatory response to those bears mentioning as well.
The Nevada gaming control system has broad power to investigate any
investor at any time if there is even the slightest hint of impropriety.226  Fur-
215 Id.
216 State v. Rosenthal, 559 P.2d 830, 833 (Nev. 1977).
217 Wynn Interview, supra note 124.
218 Id.
219 See, e.g., Epstein & Rose, supra note 92, at 118, 134.
220 GAMING REGULATION IN NEVADA, supra note 127, at 10 (noting “[t]he economic success
[of Nevada’s gaming industry] is dependent on the effective and thorough licensing of indi-
viduals and entities involved in gaming in the State.”).
221 Neilander Interview, supra note 132.
222 See generally Nin˜o Fidance, supra note 170.
223 LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS, supra note 120, at 31 (citations omitted).
224 Wynn Interview, supra note 124.
225 Id.
226 Id. (emphasis added).
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thermore, investors are continuously monitored by the GCB; therefore, DW is
continuously monitored.227  This type of intensive monitoring allows gaming
regulators to swiftly make an inquiry into any activity that would bring disre-
pute on the State of Nevada.228  However, in order to forestall any problems of
this nature, the Commission ordered DW to create an internal compliance com-
mittee, so that someone within Infinity World could ensure that DW maintains
compliance with Nevada’s gaming laws.229  Ordering companies to create
internal compliance committees is a check often used by the regulatory bodies,
so DW was treated no differently in this respect either.230
In addition to the numerous checks previously discussed, Nevada gaming
regulators have another powerful check on a SWF’s investment, one that
CFIUS may not even have.  Not only are gaming authorities able to control a
SWF’s activity within Nevada, but they also have the ability to control a SWF
even when they are operating outside Nevada’s jurisdiction.  This power is set
forth in The Foreign Gaming Act.231  The act requires licensees to operate for-
eign gaming operations in accordance with Nevada’s standards of honesty and
integrity.232  Licensees are required to operate within the laws of any gaming
jurisdiction in which they are located and to protect the integrity of Nevada
gaming by prohibiting unscrupulous conduct outside Nevada.233  Accordingly,
it is not enough for licensees to follow the laws of a jurisdiction outside of
Nevada; they also cannot engage in any conduct that would reflect discredit or
disrepute on Nevada, or act in a fashion contrary to Nevada’s public policy.234
When evaluating the many factors the GCB and Commission review dur-
ing a typical investigation, and then examining their investigation of DW and
the regulatory checks they placed upon the SWF, it appears as if Nevada’s
comprehensive and time-tested regulatory system may have wrought a rational
method for vetting SWF investment.  This allows the Nevada economy to
receive the benefits of SWF investment while at the same time effectively miti-
gating the risks that accompany it.
VI. CONCLUSION
In these times of financial turmoil, many people are pointing at Las Vegas,
gambling, and casinos as illustrations of “what is wrong in America right
now.”235  However, it is time to start looking at what the Nevada gaming indus-
try is doing right.  The Nevada gaming control agencies have likely fashioned a





231 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 463.680 - 463.720 (2007).
232 Id. §463.720(2) (1997).
233 LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS, supra note 120, at 226-27 (citations omitted).
234 NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.720(3) (1997).
235 Bo J. Bernhard, Industry Comment, The Battered Gaming Industry: A Case Study for
Our Times?, UNLV GAMING RESEARCH & REV. J. 55, 56 (2009) (Stating that perhaps the
gaming industry can provide a how-to map rather than a how-not-to map).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\2-2\NVG202.txt unknown Seq: 28 10-JAN-12 16:03
194 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:167
to avoid protectionism and run an honest, apolitical, non-discriminatory regula-
tory system.
Consequently, what is certain and has been certain for years, is that
Nevada’s gaming regulatory system will not compromise its standards for any
investors, even if they could be a knight in shining armor here to rescue the
economy.  This stance of requiring more rather than less regulation, while con-
trary to free-market economic theories, has not only proven effective in protect-
ing Nevada’s citizens but has also allowed the state’s free market economy to
achieve unprecedented levels of economic growth time and time again.236  Per-
haps it may be time to stop pointing fingers at the gaming industry as a symbol
for what is wrong with the economy and start looking at Nevada’s regulatory
framework as a good starting point for lessons on how other regulatory bodies
across the nation can use Nevada’s framework to deal with SWF investment.
236 See id. at 57.
